This paper provides firm-and industry-level evidence on the effects of capital structure on product market outcomes for a large cross-section of industries over a number of years. The analysis uses shocks to aggregate demand as surrogates for exogenous changes in the product market environment. I find that debt financing has a negative impact on firm (relative-to-industry) sales growth in industries where rivals are relatively unlevered during recessions, but not during booms. In contrast, no such effects are observed for firms competing in high-debt industries. At the industry level, I find that markups are more countercyclical when industry debt is high. The cyclical dynamics I find for firm sales growth and for industry markups are consistent with Chevalier and Scharfstein's (1996) prediction that firms that rely heavily on external financing are more likely to cut their investment in market share building in response to negative shocks to demand, and that the competitive outcomes resulting from such actions depend on the financial structures of their rivals.
Introduction
Recent theoretical work on capital structure has emphasized not only the contracting problems among agents within the firm (e.g., managers and investors), but also the implications of financing decisions for agents outside the firm (e.g., competitors and consumers). This literature stresses that a firm's mode of financing influences both the firm's conduct in its product market as well as the conduct of other market participants, thereby influencing competitive outcomes.
1 Although these theories have received much attention, only a few of their implications have been empirically examined. Directly testing those ideas is a challenging task since it is often difficult to establish whether or not the competitive outcomes associated with a firm's financing decisions were already anticipated by the firm's managers. Another concern with the interpretation of the empirical relation between capital structure and product market behavior is the possibility that both a firm's financial structure and its competitive performance may be jointly influenced by unobserved (or unmodeled) factors arising from the market environment. A study of competitive performance following capital structure changes, for instance, may assign a spurious causality to capital structure if both performance and recapitalizations are influenced by underlying trends in industry concentration, excess capacity, and growth (see Kovenock and Phillips, 1997, and Zingales, 1998) .
One way to mitigate concerns about the endogenous nature of the relation between capital structure and competitive performance is to look at performance following events affecting product market participants' incentives (or ability) to compete under existing financing arrangements. This paper uses such an approach to establish a link between firm financing and product market outcomes.
Assuming that the timing, magnitude, and consequences of macroeconomic shocks are not fully anticipated by product market participants and their financiers, I examine the sensitivity of markups and 1 A partial list of seminal theoretical papers includes Benoit (1984) , Titman (1984) , Maksimovic (1986 Maksimovic ( , 1988 , Brander and Lewis (1986) , Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , and Maksimovic and Titman (1991) . More recent papers are Williams (1995) , Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) , Dasgupta and Titman (1998), and Maurer (1999) . sales growth to financial leverage following shocks to aggregate demand.
2 My main focus, however, is on the differences in these sensitivities across industries where rivals are more debt-financed and industries where rivals are less debt-financed. Such inter-temporal and cross-sectional contrasts help sidestep the problems that usually affect the interpretation of the empirical relation between capital structure and competitive performance. In particular, my tests show that after conditioning on the phase of the business cycle and on competitors' leverage, firm debt leads to sales underperformance in some industries in certain states of demand realization, whereas under other sets of circumstances such debtled losses are either non-existent or reversed. While such findings are consistent with extant theories on the effects of capital structure on competitive performance, the contrasts I use make it difficult to identify alternative stories (or biases) capable of explaining how debt financing could lead to poor performance in some specific industries/periods precisely along the lines of the results I report.
I present two sets of results characterizing the dynamics of the interactions between capital structure and product markets. First, I use industry-level data to conduct a direct test of Chevalier and Scharfstein's (1996) theory of markup cyclicality. Consistent with the implications of their model, I
find that markups are more countercyclical in industries where firms use more external financing. My estimates suggest that the markup of a hypothetical "all-debt" industry increases by approximately 42% more than that of a "zero-debt" industry in response to a 1% decline in GDP.
I then use a panel data set containing quarterly information from firms in 71 industries covering more than two decades to study the impact of debt financing on sales performance at the firm level. My empirical strategy focuses on the differences in responses of firm sales-leverage sensitivity to macroeconomic shocks across low-debt and high-debt industries. The results show that reliance on debt 2 In some of the tests below, I allow for the possibility that firms could endogenize macroeconomic effects in their financing decisions. Notice, though, that researchers still don't know whether (and how) firms would account for those effects in their capital structure. The scant literature on this issue suggests that even if macroeconomic expectations could be incorporated in financial decisions one would still observe the "side effects" of debt. That literature suggests that "optimal" financial structures are unfeasible owing to practical issues such as tax-induced (and other institutional) biases that prevent firms from using their capital structure as an aggregate risk-sharing mechanism (see, e.g., Gertler and Hubbard, 1993) and lack of coordination among agents (Lamont, 1995). financing can significantly depress a firm's (relative-to-industry) sales growth in industries where rivals are less leveraged as economic conditions worsen. Comparing the performance of two firms in a lowdebt industry, one firm with a debt-to-asset ratio 10% above the industry average and the other with a debt-to-asset ratio 10% below that average, I find that the industry-adjusted quarterly sales growth of the more indebted firm is 1.3% lower than that of its unlevered rival following a 1% decline in GDP. In contrast, no such effects are observed in industries where rivals are relatively more indebted just prior to a similar macroeconomic shock.
I interpret my findings on cross-industry differences in cyclical movements in markups and in sales-debt sensitivities as consistent with the theory of Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) . Specifically, my findings agree with the prediction that firms which rely more heavily on external financing are more likely to reduce their investment in market share building during downturns, and that the competitive outcomes resulting from such actions are jointly determined by the firm's and by its rivals' capital structures. My firm-level results, however, cannot dismiss a state-contingent form of Telser's (1966) "long purse" argument as they suggest that, conditional on a low demand realization, indebted firms lose more (less) market share when rivals are relatively unlevered (leveraged).
This study adds to the evidence on interactions between financial structure and product markets presented in the pioneering work of Chevalier (1995a Chevalier ( , 1995b , Phillips (1995) , and Kovenock and Phillips (1997) . The paper's empirical strategy is most similar to that of Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and Zingales (1998) , who look at these interactions during periods when the competitive environment is affected by exogenous events (e.g., oil shocks and deregulation). While those studies report time-and industry-specific results, the current paper shows that the argument that a firm's financial structure influences its competitive performance is considerably more pervasive and overall economically significant than previously thought. To my knowledge, this is the first study to present evidence of a link between capital structure, product markets, and business cycles, allowing for both firm-level and macroeconomic inferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, provides an overview of some of the main arguments relating capital structure and product markets, and discusses testable hypotheses. In Section 3, I examine whether industry-wide use of debt financing influences the behavior of markups over the business cycle. In Section 4, I use firm-level data to examine the relation between firm capital structure and performance via a testing strategy that emphasizes changes in the sensitivity of sales performance to debt financing following macroeconomic shocks. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Financial structure and product markets: Some theories and hypotheses
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The goal of this paper is empirically examine the argument that capital structure influences a firm's (as well as its rivals') incentives to compete in the product market, thereby influencing competitive outcomes. Unfortunately, few of the theoretical studies proposing this argument make clear predictions about how their results would manifest in the data. Moreover, only some of those predictions can be simultaneously tested under a single empirical framework, making it difficult to dismiss one argument in favor of another. In the subsequent analysis, I study whether the ideas presented in this review section are economically significant and pervasive using fairly general empirical models relating debt financing to product market outcomes.
One of the theories examined in the literature is the "long purse" or "predation" argument. The basic story, put forth by Telser (1966) and formalized by Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , stresses that dependence on outside financing can hinder a firm's ability to fight competition, which in turn prompts financially unconstrained rivals to pursue predatory market strategies. In examining this argument, researchers often take some measure of debt financing as a proxy for financial fragility and study whether that measure is associated with competitive outcomes such as diminished profits and market share losses (see, e.g., Phillips, 1995) . The testing strategy used in this paper goes a step further in that 3 Related theoretical papers not reviewed here include, among others, Titman (1984), Rotemberg and Scharfstein (1990) , and Maksimovic and Titman (1991) . See Maksimovic (1995) for a detailed review of the literature. it only takes indebtedness to be a measure of financial fragility under a set of specific conditions: a) the firm is highly-leveraged in relation to its industry rivals, b) the firm operates in a market where the use of debt financing is generally low, and c) there is a negative shock to demand.
Financial fragility may also hinder competitiveness in models where firms use pricing as a means of investing in market share building rather than as a means of maximizing single-period profits (e.g., Gottfries, 1991, and Scharfstein, 1996) . Chevalier and Scharfstein argue that liquidityconstrained firms are less inclined to invest in market share when the liquidation probability is high. In recessions, externally-financed firms are more likely to boost price-cost margins at the expense of future sales. 4 Since prices are strategic complements, their rivals will also inflate prices, but by an extent given by their own finances. As those rivals raise their prices, the market share losses of the more constrained firms are reduced. It follows that the degree of firm markup cyclicality should depend both on the firm's own financial constraints as well as on the financial status of its rivals. At the industry level, markups should be less cyclical if firms use more external financing. These ideas are examined below.
An alternative line of argument suggests that debt may in fact contribute to firm competitive performance. According to the "strategic commitment" theory of Brander and Lewis (1986) , a firm's decision to use debt works as a commitment to more aggressive behavior in the product market. This threat is credible due to the option-like payoffs associated with debt under limited liability, and induces the firm's unlevered rivals to accommodate by reducing their output. If ex post this dynamic is found to work in the data, then one should observe market share gains for the more leveraged firms. However, one difficulty in testing this idea is that the availability of such gains should ex ante lead to a prisoners' dilemma-like behavior in which rival firms would use more debt.
Finally, debt may be related to performance in a noncausal sense. In the "industry equilibrium" models of Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) and Williams (1995) , the optimal set of financial contracts 3. Industry-level evidence on markup movements over the business cycle Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) predict that if most firms in an industry are externally (internally) financed, then the industry markup will be more countercyclical (procyclical). In this section, I use industry-level data to test this hypothesis. The results presented here are relevant in their own rightextending the empirical analysis of Scharfstein (1995, 1996) -but they are also useful for the firm-level tests conducted in Section 4. Specifically, I explore the cyclical cross-industry differences in the relationship between competitive outcomes and financial structure that are identified in this section to address the potential for estimation biases in my firm-level tests.
Data and methodology
Industry-level data are typically compiled by governmental agencies and are published at the twodigit SIC level only. To perform the tests of this section, I gather data from 20 two-digit SIC classified manufacturing industries. The most important data series I need are industry markup and leverage.
There is no consensus in the literature about the best measure of industry markup. Because the proxy proposed by Bils (1987) is less likely to overstate the degree of markup countercyclicality (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1991) , and thus less likely to allow for unwarranted conclusions about the impact of capital structure on markups over the cycle, I choose that proxy for my tests. In contrast to other markup measures, Bils' proxy allows for the marginal cost of one hour of labor to change with the level of hours worked in the industry. 6 This is relevant for tests using data from manufacturers since hours worked vary over the business cycle and firms in this sector are required by law to pay a premium for overtime hours. Similarly to other markup proxies, however, Bils' proxy might do a relatively poor job in capturing productivity shifts over the cycle.
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The industry markup measure I operationalize -a slightly simplified version of Bils (1987) -is computed in terms of log deviations from trend: 
where P is price, w is hourly average wages, r is the legal overtime premium (set to 50% To obtain Y at a quarterly frequency, I interpolate each one of the industry series with quarterly GNP. I can only match all of these series beginning in the fourth quarter of 1984. 
Marginal costs include straight-time wages, movements along the marginal wage schedule, and a productivity term. 7 As noted by a referee, this is a potentially important limitation. Some of the results below should thus be interpreted with caution. 8 The exceptions are SICs 36 and 38, for which pre-1987 data are discarded due to the well-known difficulties in reconciling information from the 1972-and the 1987-SIC code structure.
To measure industry leverage, on a quarterly basis, I compute the asset-weighted average longterm debt-to-asset ratio of firms with identical two-digit SIC codes in COMPUSTAT's P/S/T, FC and Research files (all at book values). The sample period for the tests in this section is from 1984:IV through 1996:IV. Summary statistics for various industry characteristics are reported in Table 1 .
To test whether markups are more countercyclical in industries where rivals are more externallyfinanced, I regress industry markup movements on a measure of aggregate activity, industry leverage, and a term interacting cycles and leverage. Macroeconomic movements are proxied by changes in the negative of log real GDP. Increases in this measure represent economic slowdowns, whose consequences I want to emphasize in this paper. To minimize simultaneity between markup and leverage, the latter variable enters the specification in lag form. The empirical model is written as:
In all estimations of this model, I use Hubber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent errors and also allow for within-period error clustering (see Rogers, 1993) .
Results
The first estimation reported in Table 2 examines whether markups are countercyclical, as shown in previous studies in the macroeconomics literature. I simply regress markup movements on the proxy for aggregate activity and a constant. The results point to markup countercyclicality in my data. The estimates suggest that a 1% decrease in GDP brings about a 10% increase in (relative-to-trend) industry price-cost margins. This result is statistically significant at the 1% level.
In the next set of regressions, I include industry-level variables. Since I cannot reject the presence of industry-fixed effects via standard tests, I estimate Eq. (2) with data in first differences (see Hsiao, 1986 ). The OLS-fixed effects estimates displayed in row 2 of Table 2 are the most important results of this section. The significantly positive coefficient for the interaction term indicates that higher industrywide indebtedness leads markups to increase faster during downturns. Consistent with Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) , these estimates suggest that negative shocks to demand prompt firms to raise pricecost margins more (or cut them less) in industries with more externally-financed competitors.
To gauge the macroeconomic implications of these results, note that absent any shocks (i.e., when ∆Log(GDP) equals zero) markups decrease by approximately 1% per 1% increase in leverage.
Adjusting for industry differences, the estimates in row 2 imply that the markup of a hypothetical "alldebt" industry would increase by nearly 42% more than that of a "zero-debt" industry in response to a 1% decline in GDP. This finding points to feedback effects going from the corporate sector to the overall economy, with potential policy implications. For instance, this evidence suggests that past firm financing decisions may become a source of inflationary pressures during recessions.
Interpretation and Robustness
A potential problem with the interpretation of the results reported in row 2 is that the business cycle measure I use may not help distinguish changes in markups that are caused by demand shocks from those that are caused by cost shocks. For instance, if following a supply-side shock such as an increase in energy prices, GDP falls and unemployment increases, then markups could appear to be countercyclical even though changes in aggregate demand are of second-order. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and Ghosal (2000) , I control for cost shifts in the estimation of Eq. (2) by adding a proxy for changes in energy prices. This variable is measured as the change in the ratio of the fuel price index to the price index of industrial commodities. As noted by Ghosal, though, changes in energy prices will affect not only costs but also demand in some industries. Using that author's approach, I
exclude industries that are likely to fall in this category (SICs 35 and 37) from the estimation. The results for the new specification, shown in row 3 of Table 2 show that my conclusions are unaffected by the inclusion of that extra control.
Alternatively, suppose that sales/prices are more sensitive to the level of aggregate activity in some industries than in others, and that firms in cycle-sensitive industries choose (ex ante) to carry low debt.
In this case too markups may fall more in less leveraged industries during recessions. But if this story drives my results, I would expect the evidence of debt-led markup countercyclicality to disappear -or, at least, the magnitude of the coefficients to be affected -once I explicitly account for cycle-sensitivity in my model. Following the approach used by Chevalier and Scharfstein (1995) in addressing a similar concern, I add an indicator variable for cycle-sensitive industries to Eq. (2). This dummy is based on the dichotomy proposed by Sharpe (1994) , which groups industries according to the covariance between their sales and the GNP. The set of high covariance industries includes all the durable goods industries (except SICs 32 and 38) plus SIC 30. I refer to these industries as "durables." In row 5 of Table 2 , I report the results obtained after including the durables dummy. The size and significance of the debt-cycle coefficients suggest that my results cannot be explained away by that alternative story.
Another explanation for why price-cost margins may rise in recessions is that firms in noncompetitive markets may be more likely to collude when gains from deviation are not promising (see Saloner, 1986, and Woodford, 1991) . Chevalier and Scharfstein's (1996) theory of financial structure determining markup movements over the cycle questions this view.
But if concentration and debt are positively correlated, then my results could be reflecting this collusion story, and I would be too aggressive in rejecting the null of capital structure irrelevance. To address this concern, I modify Eq. (2) by including a dummy variable based on the same four-firm concentration ratios used by Rotemberg and Saloner. I assign to the "high concentration" group those industries with ratios above the median ratio in Table 2 of their paper. The estimates in row 6 of Table 2 suggest that capital structure explains industry markup cyclicality despite of differences in market concentration.
Finally, because data differencing can bias the OLS estimator if regressors are only weakly exogenous, I perform a 2SLS estimation of Eq. (2) where leverage is instrumented by two lags of itself, with the interaction term being modified accordingly. 9 The 2SLS estimates of row 7 strongly support my previous conclusions about debt-induced markup countercyclicality. In unreported regressions, I use changes in the unemployment rate as the proxy for cycles, obtaining qualitatively similar results. The same applies when I use log changes in prices (rather than markups) as the dependent variable in Eq.
(2). These robustness checks make it difficult to dismiss the evidence of a link between corporate financing and markup cyclicality stemming from debt-induced behavior in the product markets.
Firm-level evidence on market share building over the business cycle
The endogeneity of financing decisions makes it difficult to identify a causal relation going from capital structure to competitive performance at the firm level. Any testing of the theory has to explicitly accommodate the need to address concerns with endogenous and other estimation biases. One way to minimize such concerns is to look at competitive performance following exogenous events altering both the product market environment and rival firms' incentives/ability to compete under the existing set of financing arrangements (see Zingales, 1998) . The tests of this section use such an approach.
In identifying events suitable for a general testing approach, I consider a number of issues. First, there must be an exogenous, real-side shock to the competitive environment. Second, the shock should allow for unanticipated effects of financial structure. In other words, the nature of the shock should make it difficult for firms and their financiers to fully endogenize all of its consequences in their financing agreements. Third, the event should not be industry-specific, but rather affect a large crosssection of industries at the same time so as to provide a number of useful cross-sectional contrasts for the relation between a firm's performance and its rivals' finances.
I find that periods surrounding shocks to aggregate demand provide the conditions needed for such a test. In particular, consider the recent recession episodes in the United States. These have been typically accompanied by contractionary measures by the monetary authority as well as tougher credit terms for borrowers. 10 Since debt is likely to bind firm behavior in periods when income from operations is unusually low, and because it is difficult to renegotiate contracts when credit is tight, these concurrent movements should provide for crisp results on the relation between capital structure and product markets. Specifically, concerns with simultaneity problems affecting the relation between firm performance and capital structure will be lessened around these exogenous shocks to demand and credit: the shocks will affect all firms in a market, but according to the theory, those firms should respond differently depending on their own financing and on the financing of their rivals. I examine these cross-sectional differences and their intertemporal evolution in the tests that follow.
Data
I put together firm-, industry-, and macro-level data for a period long enough to capture a number of shocks to aggregate activity. Issues concerning data availability and consistency lead me to restrict the analysis to the 1976:I-1996:IV period. The firm-level data (all CPI-deflated) are obtained from COMPUSTAT's P/S/T, FC and Research tapes. Using the quarterly tapes, I retrieve book data on total assets, long-term debt, sales, and plant, property and equipment (PPE). I use a firm's primary three-digit SIC code to identify its product market, restricting the analysis to firms in the 200-399 SIC range (manufacturing). Following Clarke (1989) , I discard firms assigned to SICs that fail to identify 10 Evidence on such co-movements in financial and real macroeconomic variables is provided in Bernanke and Blinder (1992) , Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) , and Lown and Morgan (2001) 
Measuring firm performance
In examining the interactions between product markets and capital structure, empirical research has often linked price-setting behavior with some aspect of debt financing (see, e.g., Chevalier, 1995b , Phillips, 1995 , and Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996 . 12 In some settings, pricing should reasonably reflect how a firm's financial status affects its competitive behavior. More generally, however, firms can implement a number of alternative policies that significantly affect product market outcomes, but that may not be reflected in how they price their products. Examples of such policies are decisions about fixed investments, R&D expenditures, use of promotions, etc. One way to build a practical measure of performance that incorporates information from the combined effects of pricing and other market strategies is to look at changes in the firm's share of its industry sales. In this section, I use a firm's relative-to-industry sales growth (which I improperly refer to as market share growth) to gauge its performance in the product market. This proxy can be seen as a suitable compromise for the proposed analysis: it can be consistently measured across many industries and periods, but it is too general to pin down the various mechanisms contributing to the outcomes observed in each of the markets sampled.
Estimation methodology
A two-step procedure
The estimation methodology I use is very similar to that of Kashyap and Stein (2000) . The idea is to 11 Some firms may be too diversified or lack enough counterparts to make up a three-digit industry. These firms are assigned to three-digit codes ending with zero. Other codes combine "miscellaneous" and "not elsewhere classified" businesses, and seem unfit for inclusion in my tests. See Clarke (1989) for more details.
12 Kovenock and Phillips (1997) and Zingales (1998) study other product market outcomes, such as market exit.
estimate the effect of macro-level shocks on firm-level "sensitivities" via a two-step procedure that combines cross-sectional and times series regressions. The approach sacrifices estimation efficiency, but reduces the likelihood of Type I inference errors -that is, it reduces the odds of concluding that capital structure matters when it really does not.
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The initial step of the two-stage estimation consists of a purely cross-sectional regression that is meant to produce a time-specific estimate of the sensitivity of product market performance to financial structure. At each quarter, t, I regresses the log change of firm i's sales on four lags of itself, four lags of the log change in PPE, the lagged log of total assets, and the lagged leverage ratio:
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Lags of sales growth are included to control for firm-specific characteristics that contribute to performance over time. Changes in PPE and total assets are also included as controls on the grounds that the leverage coefficient may be biased if the model fails to control for investment spending, which might have been financed with debt, or for the portion of leverage that is explained by a higher borrowing capacity. The focus is on the estimate of the sensitivity of sales growth to leverage. To help reduce the potential for reverse causality between sales performance and debt, I compute leverage as the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to total assets. This measure best suits my tests for at least two reasons. First, in contrast to market values, book values of debt are less sensitive to capital markets' assessments about future cash flows. Second, while leverage changes are likely to reflect changes in expectations about future product market outcomes, long-term leverage levels are more likely to reflect the cumulative effect of past decisions.
Before estimating Eq. (3), I adjust all observations of the dependent variable for their industry-specific (sales-weighted) means, so that this variable measures the firm's sales growth relative to that of its competitors. 14 The right-hand side variables are also industry-adjusted, and thus the average rival's leverage is the metric used to measure a firm's indebtedness. These adjustments help with the interpretation of the results and minimize the potential for biases induced by unobserved industry effects. After each run of Eq. (3), the estimated leverage coefficient is collected and "stacked" in a time series vector, δ t .
In the second-stage, I regress the resulting time series of first-stage coefficients -that is, the δ t vector -on four lags of a measure of economic activity that proxies for the worsening of macroeconomic conditions, plus a constant and a time trend:
Activity
Trend u δ η φ γ
I use two alternative proxies for negative shocks to activity in all estimations performed: a) the negative of the change in log real GDP, and b) the change in the unemployment rate (×100). 15 Since my tests should help distinguish between real and financial explanations for the observed relation between sales growth and debt, I also check whether the proxy for economic activity retains significant predictive power after conditioning on other macroeconomic factors. To do so, I estimate alternative versions of Eq. (4) that include additional macro variables: a) the Federal Reserve funds rate (Fed funds), b) the spread between the rates paid on six-month commercial paper and 180-day T-bills (paper-bill spread), 16 and c) the Consumer Price Index (CPI). These series are obtained from the Federal Reserve's Statistical 14 The COMPUSTAT tapes do not contain data on the entire universe of firms. The tapes usually lack data on very small industry players, and thus the market share figures for the firms in my sample are likely to be slightly inflated. These data coverage limitations should not systematically bias my inferences. 15 To see how this procedure accounts for the error contained in the first-step, assume that the true δ t * equals what is estimated from the first-step run (δ t ) plus some residual (ε t ): δ t * = δ t + ε t . One would like to estimate Eq. (4) as δ t * = η + Xβ β β β + ω t , where the error term would only reflect the errors associated with the specification of the model.
However, the empirical version of Eq. (4) uses δ t (rather than δ t * ) on the right hand-side. Consequently, so long as E[X′ε] = 0, η will absorb the mean of ε t , while u t will be a mixture of ε t and ω t . That is, the measurement errors of the first-step will increase the total error variance in the second-step, but will not bias the coefficient estimates in β β β β.
Release H.15 and from the BLS. In the bivariate version of Eq. (4), I add the change in the Fed funds rate to the right-hand side as a proxy for the stance of monetary policy. In the multivariate version of Eq. (4), I also include the changes in the paper-bill spread and changes in the CPI.
To gauge the economic relevance and the statistical significance of shocks to demand on the sensitivity of sales growth to debt, I compute both the sum of the coefficients for the four lags of the measure of economic activity -that is, the Σφ k 's in Eq. (4) OLS and 2SLS. In all estimations, I use heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors using Newey-West (1987) .
Cross-industry comparisons
Although the use of exogenous shocks to the competitive environment such as recessions help lessen concerns about endogeneity in the performance-capital structure relation, the estimations are not free from simultaneity biases arising from unobservable firm characteristics that may influence both a firm's debt before the recession begins and its sales performance afterwards. Fortunately, the theories considered provide for a way of addressing this problem. Those theories propose that the extent to which a firm's financing influences its competitive performance should be a function of the financial status of its competitors, and thus a firm's performance-capital structure relation should differ across markets depending on its rivals' finances. Accordingly, in the tests of this section I compare estimates of firm sales-debt sensitivities from industries where rivals are more leveraged with those from industries where rivals are less leveraged. 17 Focusing on differences in responses of sales-debt sensitivities to macroeconomic shocks across sets of firms in different industry debt categories will render irrelevant the concerns that my two-step estimated coefficients could be biased in the levels.
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Implementing a test that emphasizes those contrasts is a straightforward task with my two-step procedure. At each quarter, t, I rank the sample industries according to their leverage ratios and assign firms in the bottom and top quintiles of that industry ranking to different groups (low-and high-debt industries, respectively). Next, also on a quarterly basis, I estimate Eq. (3) separately for firms competing in low-debt industries and for firms in high-debt industries as of the previous period (t−1), saving the estimated leverage coefficients from each of these cross-sectional regressions in individual time series vectors, δ t 's. These series are used as the dependent variables in separate estimations of Eq.
(4), and the results from these estimations are then compared.
To facilitate comparisons of results across the industry groups, I report not only the individual estimated responses of sales-debt sensitivities to macro shocks for firms in the low-debt and in the highdebt groups, but also the differences in these responses. Standard errors for the "difference coefficients" are estimated via a SUR system that combines the two groups (p-values reported).
Results
Fig. 1 provides descriptive evidence of remarkably distinct dynamics for the relation between a
firm's sales performance and its capital structure conditional on rivals' finances and on the state of aggregate demand. The figure shows the cyclical behavior of the first-step estimated sales-debt 17 Recall, the results in Section 3 already indicate that (average) rivals' finances influence product market dynamics. Those results suggested that there is less competition in the price-setting dimension during recessions when the average industry competitor is more indebted. The interpretation was that an indebted firm facing a recession is able to increase prices more without loosing customers when its rivals are also leveraged and thus are expected to behave in the same way.
18 This is true unless there exists some reason why those biases should be systematically more pronounced in certain industries than in others precisely along the lines of the sample partitions used below. Zingales (1998) also emphasizes the use of cross-sectional differences in studying performance-debt relation following a shock to the competitive environment. sensitivity (δ t ) of low-and high-debt industries for the 1977:I-1996:II period; where I isolate the cyclical from secular movements in δ t using the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) decomposition. Notice that the sales-debt sensitivity of firms in low-debt industries trails below its trend twice: during the downturns of the early 1980s, and in a more prolonged period that starts with the 1990-91 recession. The cyclical behavior of high-debt industries' δ t is markedly different. Table 3 presents estimates of the impact of negative shocks to macroeconomic activity on firm sales-debt sensitivities for both low-and high-debt industries and for different combinations of firstand second-step specifications. Panel A displays results from models in which the dependent variable is the series of first-step δ t 's estimated via OLS, while results in Panel B are for δ t 's estimated via 2SLS.
Across rows, the top half of each panel features the negative of the change in log real GDP as the proxy for shocks to activity, while in the bottom half the change in the unemployment rate is the relevant measure of change in aggregate conditions. Each panel displays six pairs of estimated responses of the one-quarter ahead δ t to shocks to economic activity (i.e., the Σφ k 's in Eq. (4)) along with the associated SUR results for differences in responses across industry groups (i.e., the low-debt Σφ k 's minus the highdebt Σφ k 's). To conserve space, I only report the difference coefficients for the four-quarters ahead δ t 's.
Focusing first on the results for the one-quarter δ t 's of Panel A, note that for each of the regression pairs the impact of the macro variable of interest is negative for firms operating in low-debt industries.
These coefficients are statistically significant at the 2% level in all but one of the estimations. In contrast, for firms in high-debt industries, none of the coefficients is significantly different from zero, with most of them returning a positive sign. The differential impact of economic downturns on salesdebt sensitivities across high-and low-debt industries reported in the table (see the Low−High columns) is negative for all regression pairs. The differences are statistically significant at the 2.9% level or better in nine of the twelve cases. Somewhat stronger results are reported in Panel B, which uses 2SLS-δ t 's. These findings suggest that, following negative shocks to activity, highly-leveraged firms lose market share in industries where rivals are relatively unleveraged, but that those losses are reversed in non-recession periods. In contrast, such competitive dynamics are not observed in high-debt industries.
The exclusion test p-values indicate that changes in the state of the economy are particularly relevant in predicting the sensitivity of firm sales growth to leverage in low-debt industries. For multivariate estimations, the business cycle measures have marginal predictive power at the 4% level or better in all cases. This shows that weakening of economic activity alone predicts the increase in the sales-debt sensitivity beyond what other macroeconomic factors would predict.
Economic interpretation
Thus far I have mostly emphasized the statistical significance of my results. However, the most interesting question is whether the estimates I report imply economically meaningful magnitudes.
To gauge the economic significance of the results in Table 3 , first consider the relative performance of two hypothetical firms competing in a low-debt industry. Assume that these firms are equal in all dimensions except capital structure: one firm has a debt-to-asset ratio 10% above the industry average ratio, while its rival has a debt-to-asset ratio 10% below that average. Now consider the estimate of the impact of four lags of the change of the log real GDP on the sales-debt sensitivity of firms in low-debt industries in the multivariate specification of Panel A (= −6.3). This estimate implies that the industry-adjusted sales growth of the more indebted firm is expected to be nearly 1.3% (= −0.063 × (0.1 − (−0.1)) lower than that of its unlevered rival following a 1% decline in GDP. This difference is nontrivial considering that in a regression of quarterly industry sales growth on four lags of changes in GDP for low-debt industries over the 1977-96 period I find that total industry sales fall by 1.2% following a 1% decline in GDP.
One can also use the results from the same specification to draw inferences about the sales growth of similarly highly-leveraged firms competing in industries with significantly different average debt levels. In this case too the imputed effect of the shock to activity is noteworthy. Four quarters following a 1% decline in GDP, the quarterly sales growth of the firm in the low-debt industry should underperform that of its high-debt industry counterpart by 0.8%.
Overall, the results of this section show that highly-leveraged firms lose market share in recessions (but not in booms) only in industries where rivals are relatively unleveraged. Recall from Section 3, that markups also fall more in low-debt industries during recessions. These firm-and industry-level cyclical dynamics seem consistent with Chevalier and Scharfstein's (1996) argument that financially constrained firms invest less in market share in low states, and that the extent to which market share is actually lost depends on the financial status of their rivals. Also note that the firm-level results of this section cannot dismiss a "state-contingent" form of the long purse story, as they suggest that unconstrained firms capture market share from their indebted rivals in low-demand states. Finally, the nature of time and cross-sectional variations in performance-debt relation makes it difficult to ascribe my findings to the industry equilibrium theories discussed in Section 2.
Robustness
To check that my conclusions do not hinge on any particular choice of lag structure, I also estimate the above two-step procedure using two, six, and eight lags of the right-hand side macroeconomic variables, as well as with the inclusion of contemporaneous (lag 0) observations. All of these specifications yield qualitatively similar results (unreported). The same applies when I use other alternative measures of monetary policy. My conclusions also hold for various subperiods examined in the 1976-1996 span.
My testing strategy focuses on the responses of sales-debt sensitivities to macroeconomic shocks. I choose to emphasize the observed cross-sectional differences in those responses (rather than their levels) because of concerns with underlying characteristics that could influence both a firm's debt before the recession and its performance afterwards. Accordingly, on theoretical grounds, I split the sample industries according to their debt usage. However, one could argue that if product demand is more sensitive to the level of aggregate activity in some markets than in others, then the average debt in industries with higher (lower) demand cyclicality should be lower (higher).
19 Now suppose costs of financial distress are higher in more cycle-sensitive industries and that the costs associated with financial distress for the more leveraged firms in a industry include market share losses (see Opler and Titman, 1994) . Then one could observe more negative sales-debt sensitivities for high leverage firms in low-debt industries relative to that of similarly leveraged firms in high-debt industries following a decline in activity just because low-debt industries are more cycle-sensitive. This alternative story suggests that my industry leverage-based partitions could be inadvertently picking up differences in cycle sensitivities across industries.
To verify the extent to which that story could affect my conclusions I need to check whether my findings on differences in sales-debt sensitivities across low-and high-debt industries remain after I impose controls for cross-industry differences in the cycle-sensitivity of product demand.
Unfortunately, there are no fine measures for the cycle sensitivity of different industries, and thus I can only check whether this problem is of first-order concern. My proxy for industry demand cyclesensitivity follows from Sharpe (1994) , who classifies industries into two groups ("durables" and "nondurables") based on the covariance between industry sales and the GNP (see Section 3). I employ Sharpe's dichotomy as a conditioning variable in my tests. The idea is as follows. Suppose that alternative story is true. Then, unconditional comparisons between the coefficients for Σφ k 's across lowand high-debt industries would just reflect the magnitude of the differences in the responses of salesdebt sensitivities to aggregate shocks across cycle-sensitive and insensitive industries. Consider in turn partitioning the sample according to whether the observations belong to cycle-sensitive or insensitive industries and performing the two-step procedure separately for each of the subsamples. Then, under that same competing story, the conditional comparisons across low-and high-debt industries should yield much smaller (perhaps insignificant) magnitudes for the estimated differences in Σφ k 's.
Results from the multivariate version of Eq. (4) where the dependent variable is the one-quarter δ t are shown in rows 1 (durables) and 2 (nondurables) of each of the two panels of Table 4 . Consistent with my earlier findings, in both subsamples, sales growth responds negatively to leverage following a negative aggregate shock in industries where rivals carry low debt, but not in high-debt industries. In the durables regressions, the coefficients for the low-debt equation are negative and statistically significant at the 3% level or better in all cases. These same coefficients are also negative but less statistically significant in the nondurables regressions. As before, all coefficients in the high-debt equations are insignificantly different from zero. Most importantly, all of the difference coefficients in Table 4 retain the right sign, and their magnitudes are very similar to those displayed in Table 3 , which suggests that the case for cycle-sensitivity of demand influencing industry debt does not alter my main conclusions. 
Concluding remarks
Recent theoretical research has proposed that capital structure can affect firm performance in the product markets because financing arrangements can alter a firm's incentives (or ability) to compete. In this paper, I investigate this claim by examining the impact of debt financing on industry markups and on firm sales growth using data from a large cross-section of industries over a number of years. My tests show that debt has a negative impact on relative-to-industry firm sales growth in industries where rivals are relatively unlevered during recessions, but not during booms. At the industry level, I find that markups are more countercyclical (i.e., they increase more in recessions) when industry debt is high.
These results seem consistent with Chevalier and Scharfstein's (1996) prediction that financially constrained firms have greater incentives to boost short-term profits at the expense of future sales in response to negative shocks to demand.
While results from inter-industry studies are inherently difficult to interpret, they can provide valuable insights. I take my findings as evidence that capital structure influences competitive performance in a systematic way. Overall, my results suggest that firms' financing choices have implications for cyclical dynamics in general, and for the dynamics of strategic interactions in product markets in particular. These dynamics should be carefully accounted for in future work by both macro and financial economists. Table 1 Industry summary statistics. Industries are defined at the two-digit SIC code level and the sample period is 1984:IV-1996:IV. Leverage is computed quarterly as the asset-weighted average debt-toasset ratio using firm-level data from COMPUSTAT. Capacity utilization is available from the Federal Reserve's Statistical Release G.17. Four-firm concentration ratios are taken from Table 2 in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) . The "durable" vs. "nondurable" dichotomy is from Sharpe (1994 (1) in the text. Industries are defined at the two-digit SIC code level and the sample period is 1984:IV-1996:IV. Estimations include a constant term (coefficients omitted). The measure of cyclicality is the negative of the log real GDP. Leverage is computed quarterly for each industry as the asset-weighted average debt-to-asset ratio using firm-level book data. Capacity utilization is the industry quarterly production as a percentage of normal production. Cost shocks are proxied by the change in fuel and energy price index to industry commodity PPI. The "durables" vs. "nondurables" dichotomy is from Sharpe (1994) . The "high" four-firm concentration dummy is based on data from Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) . Fixed effects (FE) estimations eliminate industry effects by differencing the data. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) are used to control for biases caused by differencing if leverage is only weakly exogenous. The set of instruments includes two lags of leverage (in levels). All estimations use Hubber-White heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics which also allow for within-period error clustering (see Rogers, 1993 
Table 3
Sales-debt sensitivities and the business cycle: two-stage estimator. The dependent variable is the estimated sensitivity of sales growth to leverage (either via OLS or 2SLS) for firms operating in industries categorized as low vs. highly leveraged. In each estimation, the dependent variable is regressed on four lags of a measure of aggregate economic activity and a time trend. In the bivariate regressions, the change in the Fed funds rate is added. In multivariate regressions the changes in Fed funds rate, the change in the CPI, and the change in the spread between the rates on commercial paper and the six month T-Bill are included. The sample period is 1976:I-1996:IV. The sum of the coefficients for the four lags of the economic activity measure is shown along with the p-value for the sum. Exclusion test rows report the p-values for the rejection of the hypothesis that the four lags of the economic activity measure do not forecast the sensitivity of sales growth to debt. Heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent errors are computed with a Newey-West (1987) Table 4 Sales-debt sensitivities and the business cycle: subsamples. The dependent variable is the one-quarter ahead estimated sensitivity of sales growth to leverage ratio (either via OLS (δ OLS ) or 2SLS (δ 2SLS )), for firms operating in industries categorized as low vs. highly leveraged. In each estimation, the dependent variable is regressed on four lags of a measure of aggregate economic activity, four lags of the change in the Fed funds rate, four lags of the change in the CPI, four lags of the change in the spread between the rates on commercial paper and the six month T-Bill, and a time trend. The sample period is 1977:I-1996:IV. The sum of the coefficients for the four lags of the economic activity measure is shown along with the p-value for the sum. Exclusion test rows report the p-values for the rejection of the hypothesis that the four lags of the economic activity measure do not forecast the sensitivity of sales growth to debt. Heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent errors are computed with a Newey-West (1987) lag window of size four. The standard errors for the difference of the sum of the four lags of the economic activity measure are computed with a SUR system that estimates industry categories regressions jointly. The "durables" (high covariance of sales growth to GDP) subsample contains 75,423 firm-quarters in 36 distinct three-digit SICs, while the "nondurables" (low covariance) subsample contains 80,360 firm-quarters in 35 industries. 
